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NOTES AND COMMENTS

as insurance are involved it will be a rare case indeed where all claimants
can be personally served with process within one state. Thus, the only
way that the stakeholder can be sure that he is protecting himself is to
bring suit in the federal courts under the Interpleader Act, thereby
making possible service of process anywhere in the United States.' 9
The liberal construction placed by the federal courts upon the diversity
requirements of the Act is salutary. It would be tragic indeed if the
remedial effect envisaged in reducing the jurisdictional amount, allowing process to run throughout the United States, liberalizing venue
provisions, and abolishing the historical requirements that the claims
be identical and have a common origin, 20 should be practically annihilated in a narrow construction of the diversity provisions of the Act.
MAX OLIVER COGBURN.

Future Interests-Rule of Convenience in Class Gifts
In a recent North Carolina case' the following clause of a will was
before the court for interpretation:
"ITEM V 'I will, devise, and bequeath to my beloved
nephews 2 and any other children who may be borne to Robert
and Peg Cole, my house and lot at 301 Fayetteville together with
the contents, and the lot west of the home on Fayetteville Road.' "
At the time of the execution of the will Robert and Peg had three
children and at the testator's death, almost three years after the execution, there was a fourth child en ventre sa mere. The court was called
upon to decide what children of Robert and Peg should be included in
the gift. Should the gift go only to those three in esse at the testator's
'death and to the fourth en ventre sa mere or should it include also all
children born to Robert and Peg after the testator's death? The court
held that the roll was not to be called until the possibility of any further
issue was extinct by reason of the death of Robert or Peg.
The general rule for the determination of the members of a class
where the gift is immediate3 is that only those members in esse or en yentre sa mere at the testator's death may take under the gift and any persons who fit the description of the class but are born after the testator's
death are excluded unless the clear intention of the testator is shown to
U. S. C. §2361 (1948).
oSee note 2 supra.

1028

1 Cole
-

the

v. Cole, 229 N. C. 757, 51 S.E. 2d 491 (1948).

Robert and Peg Cole were testator's nephew and niece. The court interpreted
word "Nephews" to mean "grand-nephews."

'A gift is immediate where the conveyor, having present ownership of the
subject matter limits the corpus thereof to designated groups, annexing no condition precedent, interposing no period of time before enjoyment and creating no
interest prior to that of the takers. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, EXPLANATORY NOTE
§294 (1940).
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include them. 4 This is known as the rule of convenience and is almost
universally accepted. The court in the present case recognizes and
accepts this rule but refuses to close the class at the testator's death,
holding that a clear intention is shown by the words of the testator to
include any and all class members born after his death. The reasons
behind this rule of convenience are suggested by its name. If the class
is allowed to remain open until all possibility of increase is gone the
members of the class in esse or en ventre sa mere at the testator's death,
in most cases, would attain only limited and restricted benefits from the
gift for a considerable period of time. By application of the rule, however, the present members may utilize and enjoy the gift immediately
without restriction and without having to put up costly bonds to indemnify later born members; the quick settlement of the estate in the
interest of public policy is facilitated; and the property is more freely
alienable without possibility of cloud or defect in title. Even where the
rule is inapplicable North Carolina has now by statute7 provided for
the sale, lease, or mortgage of land where there are unborn interests.
The unborn interests are represented by guardians ad litem, and the
proceeds of the sale, lease, or mortgage are held in trust until the class
is closed and then distributed to the class. While this makes the land
more freely alienable the other objections to holding the class open are
still present in that the devisee's enjoyment of his gift is postponed, and
the estate is not brought to an early settlement.
A limitation to the applicability of the rule is the legal principle
frequently stated by the courts: that where the intent of the testator is
clearly shown such intent must govern the construction of the will.8
It is due to this desire of giving great weight to the testator's intention
that the present case and the majority hold the rule of convenience to
be nothing more than a rebuttable presumption, 9 while others indicate
that it is an inexorable rule of law 10 and apply the rule regardless of
any intention shown. In those jurisdictions holding the rule to be a
rebuttable presumption the determination of when an intent of the testator is shown so as to permit the courts to disregard the rule has been

Shinn v. Motley, 56 N. C. 490 (1857) ; Merrill v. Winchester, 120 Me. 203,
113 At!. 261 (1921) ; Hepburn v. Winthrop, 83 F. 2d 566 (D. C. Cir. 1936) ; 2
SimEs, FUTun INTr.ESTS §374 (1936).

'Long, Class Gifts in North Carolina, 22 N. C. L. Rar. 297, 314 (1944).

6 The rule in Kentucky is different in that if the class members are children
of a near relative of the testator the class remains open until all possibility of
increase is extinct. Patterson's Executor v. Dean, 241 Ky. 671, 44 S. W. 2d 565
(1931).
7
N. C. SEss. L. 1949, c. 811. Discussed in 27 N. C. L. Rav. 415 (1949).
8'Rigsbee v. Rigsbee, 215 N. C. 757, 3 S. E. 2d 331 (1939).
'Cole v. Cole, 229 N. C. 757, 51 S. E. 2d 491 (1948) ; Sawyer v. Toxey, 194
N. C. 341, 139 S. E. 692 (1927) ; Shinn v. Motley, 56 N. C. 490 (1857).
'0 Mason v. White, 53 N. C. 421 (1862); Ringrose v. Brambam, 2 Cox 384,
30 Eng. Rep. 177 (1794).
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a subject of much controversy both in the United States and England

due to the subjectiveness of the question.
In the early case of Petaway v. Powell"-the North Carolina court,
by dictum, in a holding which excluded the members of a class born
after the testator's death, said that in accordance with the rule of convenience, if a legacy were given to the children of the testator's daughter "begotten or to be begotten" any children born after the testator's
death would be excluded.
But in the later case of Shinn v. Motley 12 the North Carolina court
held that the words "to all their children which now are or hereafter
may be" show a clear intent of the testator to include all those children
born before or after his death so the rule was not applied. The court
cited as a precedent the North Carolina case of Shull v. Johnson13 but
there the words "to my nieces and nephews that might be living at or
after my death," as used in the will, without doubt showed the testator's intent to include those nieces and nephews born after his death.
It might be argued that the words "or hereafter may be" were intended
by the testator to mean those children born between the making of the
will and his death' 4 and thus the rule would apply to close the class at
his death since the intention of the testator to take the case out of the
rule must be clearly expressed. 15 In two cases 16 decided soon after the
Shinn case the court, relying on the Shinn case, held that the word
"hereafter" was intended by the testator to include all members of the
class born before or after his death although the gift in each case was
immediate. These cases seem to indicate that the court was departing
from the construction as stated in Petaway v. Powell' 7 although the
court did not overrule, distinguish, or even cite the Petaway case. However, in the later case of Sawyer v. Toxey' 8 the court, when confronted
-"22 N. C. 308 (1839) (there the words in the will were: "to A and his children").
1256 N. C. 490 (1857).
1355 N. C. 202 (1855) ; The court also cited: Scott v. Earl of Scarborough,
1 Beav. 154, 48 Eng. Rep. 898 (1838) (trust with the proceeds for all and every
the child and children of testator's children "now born or who shall hereafter be
born during the lifetime of their respective parents." Held: this included all class
members born as long as there was possibility of increase. This expressly includes
all such members.).
"4Butler v. Lowe, 10 Sim. 317, 59 Eng. Rep. 636 (1839) ("begotten or to be
begotten." The court held the words "to be begotten" to mean any members born
between the date of execution of the will and the death of the testator.).
1 Shinn v. Motley, supra.
' 0 Pickett v. Southerland, 60 N. C. 615 (1864) ("to the rest of my nieces
that Mary now has or may hereafter have!'); Roper v. Roper, 58 N. C. 16 (1859)
("A's children that she has now or may hereafter have").
' 22 N. C. 308 (1839).
'8 194 N. C. 341, 139 S. E. 692 (1927)
(the court found an intent of the testator to close the class at his death in another clause of the will also but said that
the words describing the class are alone sufficient to close the class at his death
since no intent to keep it open longer isshown by the words.) ; in the case of
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with a will by which the testator left property to the children of two
daughters and four sons "or any other of my children who may have
children borned to them after the date of this will," held that only those
grandchildren in esse at the testator's death were entitled to share in
the property. The court there recognized the principle that if the testator's intent were clearly expressed to include later born members of the
class the rule would not operate to exclude them, but considered that
this was not such a case.
The cases from other jurisdictions are as controversial on this subject as are those from North Carolina. The Maine court in Merrill v.
Winchester,10 though recognizing the rule of convenience as merely a
rebuttable presumption, refused to take the case out of the general rule
where the will provided: 'and to her children, grandchildren, and,
great-grandchildren now living or hereafter born, I give and bequeath
the sum of three thousand dollars each, to be paid within two years
after this will is admitted to probate to those then living; and to those
born afterward, within two years from the date of birth." The court
held that "to those born afterwards" referred to any children en ventre
sa mere at the testator's death, and not to any conceived after his death.
There it was said that the language must be clear and unambiguous to
take the will out of the general rule, since without such a clear expression
it was improbable that the testator should wish to postpone the distribution of his estate so long. Other expressions as: "to all my first cousins,"'20 "my nieces and nephews by blood or marriage," 2 1 "to A and his
family," 22 have been held not to show an intent of the testator to permit
the class to increase beyond his death. And yet in a West Virginia
case 23 where the words "to E and her child or children" were used in
a will the court held that the words "or children" included any who
24
should be born after the testator's death.
In England such words as: "to his children begotten or to be beWise y. Leonhardt, 128 N. C. 289, 38 S. E. 892 (1901), where the words "to my
son Lawrences children-to be equally divided among them after the death of
my son Lawrence" were used, the court held that only those children of Lawrence
in being at the testator's death could take, the reason being that the title to the

land would be in vibubus until the class closed if left open for later born members,
This reason does not seem to be a proper one since the title might vest in those
in being subject to open up and let in after born members.
1 120 Me. 203, 113 Atl. 261 (1921).
"Howland v. Slade, 155 Mass. 415, 29 N. E. 631 (1892).
"in re Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 Atl. 188 (1925).
22

Langmaid v. Hurd, 64 N. H. 526, 15 Atl. 136 (1888).
Bently v. Ash, 59 W. Va. 641, 53 S. E. 636 (1906).
Dean v. Long, 122 Ill. 447, 14 N. E. 34 (1887) (proceeds of trust
to E and her children) ; Kilgore v. Kilgore, 127 Ind. 276, 26 N. E. 56 (1890) (now
born or which may hereafter be born) ; Downes v. Long, 79 Md. 382, 29 Atl. 827
(1894) (to wife and children of my son now living and to any other legitimate
22

2Accord:

child or children which may hereafter be born to him.
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gotten," "to every child he hath," 2 6 "to each child that may be born to
either of the children of either of my brothers lawfully begotten,"27 "to
each of the children of nephews and nieces begotten or to be begotten ' 28
have been held to exclude any class members not in esse or en ventre
sa nwre. But, on the other hand, "whether now born or hereafter to be
born" 29 has been held to include all those children born after the testator's death.
The rule of convenience applies to deeds as well as to wills. So the
words "to A and his children" in a deed will convey the land jointly to
A and any children in esse or en ventre sa mere at the execution of the
deed to the exclusion of any other children born after the execution."
But if there is an intent clearly shown in the deed to include children.
born after the execution they will be included.8 1 Some courts have
said that in the case of a deed all the grantees must be in esse at the
date of execution.8 2 This does not seem to be a proper reason for the
exclusion of after born members since the title by deed may vest in
those in being subject to open up and let in later born members by
88
shifting use.
It appears that some courts are more hesitant to include class members born after the testator's death where there is a specified amount
left to each member than where there is a total sum left to the class as
a whole, since in the former situation the entire estate frequently must
be left open until the amount due the class is determined by the dosing
of the class, while in the latter situation only that share of the estate
left to the class must remain open until the possibility of increase is
extinct.8 4 Another distinction, that between real and personal property,
is made by some courts when confronted by a gift to a class. These
courts more readily hold the class open after the testator's death where
the gift is of realty on the ground that realty is more easily administered
while being held in abeyance awaiting the close of the class than is per-

" Sprackling v. Rainier, 1 Dick. Rep. 344, 21 Eng. Rep. 302 (1761) This
case was cited as a precedent in the North Carolina case of Petaway v. Powell,
.supra.
Ringrose v. Bramham, 2 Cox 384, 30 Eng. Rep. 177 (1794).
:' Storrs v. Benbow, 2 My. & K. 46, 39 Eng. Rep. 862 (1833).
2" Butler v. Lowe, 10 Sim. 317, 59 Eng. Rep. 636 (1839).
"Defflis v. Goldschmidt, 1 Mer. 417, 35 Eng. Rep. 727 (1816). This case
was decided after the Sprackling case, supra, note 24, but did not overrule, distinguish, or even cite the Sprackling case. It was, however, cited as a precedent
in the
North Carolina case of Shinn v. Motley, supra.
'0 Heath v. Heath, 114 N. C. 547, 19 S. E. 155 (1894) ; Cullens v. Cullens, 161
N. C. 344, 77 S. E. 228 (1913) (land goes to A and his children i esse or en
ventre sa mere at the date of the deed as tenants in common.).
1 Mellichamp v. Mellichamp, 28 S. C. 125, 5 S. E. 333 (1888) (to W. and the
children she already has and such children as she may hereafter bear.).
"2Miller v. McAlister, 197 Ill. 72, 64 N. E. 254 (1902) (to M and her children,
born and to be born).
33 KALES, ESTATES, FuTURE INTERESTS, §74 (2d Ed. 1920).
" Mann v. Thompson, 69 Eng. Rep. 271 (1854).
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sonalty.8 5 These, however, do not seem to be proper distinctions since
the test of inconvenience to the entire estate as compared with the inconvenience to the members of the class then in esse, and the test of
ease of administration of realty as against personalty do not change the
expression of the testator's intention, if any, as set out in the will.
The desirability of the principle of seeking the testator's intention
and attempting to follow it in the construction of a will is recognized,
yet, in seeking the intention of the testator, it should be remembered
that there are two probable intentions: one to admit as many members
as possible into the class, the other to give the members the benefit of
the gift immediately upon the testator's death and not force them to
wait for unknown periods to enjoy their property.80 Thus when the
courts apply the rule of convenience they are upholding one probable
intention while destroying the other probable intention of the testator.
Further, the courts and legislatures have not hesitated to defeat the
testator's expressed intention when applying the Rule in Shelley's
Case,37 and by converting fees tail into fees simnpleUS in order to facilitate administration and to further the enjoyment and convenience of the
recipients of devises and grants. Why then should the courts hesitate
because of ambiguous and doubtful language in a will to exclude class
members born after the testator's death? It is submitted that unless
the testator expressly provides for any member of a class born after
his death the court should avoid inconvenience and confusion and refuse
to admit such members.
As Justice Browning of the Virginia court said :88
"The written expression of human language has never reached
such a state of precision and exactness as to preclude one of mental capacity and ingenuity from saying that one thing is meant,
and another of equal versatility saying that something else is intended. Quite frequently confusion ensues from which comes the
troublesome element which we call 'doubt' and at that juncture
the law, ever wholesome and remedial, provides the way out by
supplying its rule of construction."
VICTOR

S.

v. Cole, 229 N. C. 757, 51 S. E. 2d 491 (1948).
"Cole
LoNG, supra note 5, at 314.
ST Nichpls v. Gladden, 117 N. C. 497, 22 S. E. 459 (1895)

BRYANT, JR.

(the court there

said the Rule in Shelley's Case is an inexorable rule of law and the intention of the
grantor or testator will not be considered).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-1 (1943).
" American National Bank and Trust Co. of Danville v. Herndon, 181 Va.
17, 19, 23 S. E. 2d 768, 770 (1943).

